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Some comments on Brée & Coppens’ “The diffi culty 
of an implication task” 
David Moshman 
In a recent article in this Journal, Brée & Coppens (1976) tested Brée’s (1973) model of per-
formance on Wason’s extensively studied “four-card task.” The Brée model is of considerable in-
terest in that it (a) differentiates comprehension of the proposition to be tested from the hypothe-
sis-testing strategy itself (as do Smalley, 1974, and Moshman, 1977), and (b) is closely related to 
Piaget’s theory of formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) in its consideration of combinato-
rial analysis (elaboration of possibilities) and hypothetico-deductive reasoning (reasoning based on 
possibilities rather than facts). Unfortunately, the test of the model is marred both by incorrect pre-
dictions and questionable exclusion of subjects from the data analysis. 
The predictions of the model are discussed on p. 581 of the Brée & Coppens (1976) article and 
schematized in Table I on that page. There seem to be three discrepancies between the table and 
the verbal discussion. First, with regard to the q¯ card and the illative interpretation, it is stated that 
‘subjects using either strategy A or B would not select this card’. But Table I indicates that strategy 
B would indeed lead to the selection of the q¯  card for subjects using the illative interpretation. The 
table, rather than the text, seems to be correct in that such subjects “select any object which could 
have a symbol (hidden or visible) requiring the presence of any other particular symbol,” and there 
clearly could be a p on the other side, requiring the presence of a q. 
Later on the same page, the authors state that “subjects interpreting the proposition as illative 
implication should never select a card with an odd digit ( q¯ ), no matter which strategy they use.” 
But this confl icts with their explanation in the preceding paragraph of why this card will be chosen 
by subjects using strategy C, and with the indication in Table 1 that q¯  will be chosen by strategy B 
subjects as well. Again, the table seems to be correct, not the text. 
Finally, still discussing the effect of subjects’ interpretation of the proposition on choice of  q¯, 
the authors state that “those interpreting it as a converse, should always select such a card.” But ac-
cording to Table 1, subjects using a converse interpretation will not choose q¯ if they are using strat-
egy A. There is perhaps an ambiguity in the theory here. It could be argued that since, according 
to the defi nition of the converse interpretation in Table 1, subjects see p q¯  cases as disconfi rming, 
a card with a q¯  on it requires a p¯ on the other side and should thus be selected regardless of strat-
egy (as suggested in the text). On the other hand, if we take the converse interpretation simply to 
mean an interpretation in which p requires q and vice versa, then q¯ does not inherently require p¯ 
and should be selected only by subjects considering the implications of hidden symbols (strategies 
B and C). This latter reading of the theory, which leads to the predictions in Table 1 (but disagrees 
with those of the text), seems preferable in that it makes the modus tollens inference (p → q; 
q¯ ; therefore p¯ ) a matter of strategy rather than of interpretation. Taken this way, the Brée model 
has interesting implications not only for four-card task performance but for deductive reasoning in 
general. For example, recognizing the validity of modus tollens may not be inherent in the compre-
hension of implication but require a formal operational deductive strategy in which possible con-
clusions are considered (combinatorial analysis) and their implications traced out (hypothetico-de-
ductive reasoning), a strategy analogous to four-card task strategies B and C in the Brée model. 
Moving to the Results section of the Brée & Coppens paper, it should fi rst be noted that Table 
2, in which the results are presented, is misleading. The fi gures for both groups combined  (third 
section of the table) have apparently been summed across strategy as well as across groups, though 
the table does not clearly indicate this. Thus, under converse implication, the numbers 11, 2, and 4 
all come from column A (not B), while under illative implication the number 6 is not really in col-
umn B but rather is a sum of 1 from column A, 2 from column B, and 3 from column C. 
A more serious problem than the misleading table is the fact that the discussion of results only 
considers those 19 subjects “who evaluated the proposition as a converse or as an illative implica-
tion and selected a pattern of cards predicted by the strategy model.” The authors note that the two 
subjects using an illative interpretation but choosing p and q do not conform to the model, but fail 
to note that the subject using the illative implication but choosing p and  p¯  (a pattern not predicted 
by the model for any combination of strategy and interpretation) is equally disconfi rmatory. In ad-
dition, there are four subjects giving interpretations of the proposition not conforming to the two 
legislated in advance who are for this reason discarded from the analysis. These subjects do not in-
herently falsify the model; it would be useful to see what interpretation each of them does use and 
whether their choice patterns could result from the application of one of the three Brée strategies to 
their interpretations. 
In conclusion, the Brée & Coppens article seems to suffer from inaccuracies in making pre-
dictions, a misleading presentation of results, and questionable exclusion of subjects from the data 
analysis. It should be emphasized, however, that this in no way discredits the Brée model, which 
remains a viable and interesting model of four-card task performance, and which may have broader 
implications for deductive reasoning as well. 
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